ship to the constellation of labor, cropping patterns, and capital requirements of a specific African farming system is a critical but neglected aspect of both the historical and contemporary development of rural society and economy. It is, after all, the patterns of seasonal rainfall that trigger social and economic processes of labor, renewal of resources (food, seed, cash crops, and forage) and the shortage or abundance of harvests.
The writing of climate history in Africa is a comparatively recent phenomenon, stimulated largely by crises of food supply and perceptions of natural resource degradation in the past two decades.8 Moreover, writing on the history of the Africa climate has ignored the precedents of methodology and theme in both European and North American environmental historiography. The dominant approach has clearly been the anthropomorphic concern with establishing a direct relationship between drought and human activity, particularly as a cause of famine, migration, and demographic change. Attempts to draw climate data from oral sources have been a less than successful derivative of the otherwise valuable methological contribution of African historians.9 The primary focus of such research has been the effects of short-term climate crises, usually in the form of drought. Where limited time series of climatic variability exist, historians have analyzed them on the basis of interannual variations (year-to-year fluctuation), such as measuring drought on the basis of aggregate statistics of precipitation. The paucity of genuine climatic data is a general problem in Africa, where rainfall time series and research on proxy data (tree rings, lake bed cores, or glacier cores) remain either unavailable or underinvestigated.
Remarkably, the primary concerns of European and Amenican historians of climate-the construction of time series and the avoidance of anthropogenic indicators-clid not much concern historians of Africa, while the American West's theme of aridity as a narrative metaphor of human struggle has had much greater appeal.10 But unlike Americanist colleagues with solid data on weather and historical conditions of moisture, historians of Africa writing on issues of climate have ventured ambitious conclusions on the basis of extremely weak historical data, drawing broad conclusions about effects of climate on economic, social, and demographic change. Joseph Miller's work on the climate history of Angola, for example, sidesteps the lack of data on rainfall by arguing that: Drought is subjectively defined by its sufferers in terms of disappointed expectations of rain and his dissonant cognition of his circumstances. Thus subjective records of human responses to weather available for early centuries may be as useful for assessing the general significance of major droughts in West Central African history as the problematic instrumental record of more recent times.11
In this formulation, the question of human perceptions of past events becomes a satisfactory or even a superior substitute for Leroy Ladurie's meticulously assembled climatic times series.'2
In a more outlandish vein, J. B. Webster's 1979 edited volume Chronology, Migation, and Drought in Interlacustrine Africa invoked an embarrassingly uncritical use of oral sources to reconstruct East African climate and demographic history in a way that was at best overoptimistic and at worst grossly incompetent. Ralph Herring's chapter in that volume, for example, studied records of the Rodah Nilometer and concluded that a slight increase in Nilometer levels during the seventeenth century must have meant "a period of agricultural prosperity in Uganda." His formulation not only ignored the role of the Blue Nile (rising in the Ethiopian highlands, not Uganda) in determining seasonal Nile levels at Cairo, but reduced agricultural production purely to the effects of aggregate rainfall. 13 In recent years historians and climatologists have moved in more promising directions attempting to assemble evidence of climatic epochs in African history that may shed light on the historical economic trends and political events. Sharon Nicholson, an historical meteorologist, was among the first to reconstruct the climate history of Africa from both historical and hydrological sources. Using historical accounts, evidence of lake levels, and other proxy indicators of past climate conditions, she argued that the West African Sahel experienced several climate epochs over the course of the 800 A.D.-1600 A.D. period when, in succession, the Sahel empire states of Ghana, Mali, and Songhay developed, thrived, and declined. She hypothesized that the period c. Further south below the savanna lies the 1000 mm isohyte, which defines the woodland savanna, and marks the limits of the tsetse fly (Glossina morsitans) habitat, a barrier over which livestock (especially horses and cattle) and those dependent on them dared not trespass. Cattle, horses, sheep, donkeys, and camels all risked death from the sleeping sickness carried by the flies. Of West African livestock, only the humpless longhorn Ndama cattle carnied a genetic resistance to trypanosomiasis. The humped zebu breeds (Bos indicus) most common in Africa as a whole were relatively late arrivals in West Africa (only about 1400 years ago). The hardy zebu tolerated dry conditions well but succumbed easily to the trypanosomes of the more humid areas of West Africa.15 On the side of human disease, malaria's domain also moved with the shifting seasonal bands of moisture and movements of rainfall boundaries over the longer term.
Food supplies also historically reflect moisture in their type and reliability. Sorghum and millet, West Africa's historic cereal crops, are drought-resistant but long-maturing and offer relatively low yields per unit of land. Maize, which arrived after 1500, offered much higher yields, double cropping in some areas, and earlier maturity than Africa's indigenous cereal crops. Maize was ready to harvest or consume green months earlier and flourished in humid and semi-humid zones but quickly disappeared in many areas in the nineteenth century when annual rainfall fell below 400-500 mM. 16 What George Brooks's Landlords and Strangers adds to our understanding of the history of the Sahel and its great empire systems is his attempt to connect specific human activities such as cavalry raids and iron smithing to the dynamic of shifting and swaying West African ecological boundaries. During periods of less aridity the agricultural frontier moved north, allowing cereal-producing farners to expand their settlements into the Sahel, thus pushing the political frontiers of their ruling elite further north toward key trans-Saharan trade routes. In these times of greater moisture the domain of the tsetse also crept north, restraining the mobility of horse-borne warriors who raided peoples at the southern edge of the savanna. The 1000 mm isohyte (the tsetse frontier) provided a protective screen for the agricultural peoples who had often fallen victims to slave-raiding horsed warriors in drier conditions, tsetse, in effect, providing an effective defense against invasion. Webb points not to the relationship of specific historical events and ecology but to more subtle processes of environmental and cultural changes that dominated the savanna-Sahel zone in the twilight years after the decline of the great empire states. He argues that the general shifts in climate/ecology/economy that took place between the fourteenth and the seventeenth century brought desert, savanna, and Sahelian peoples in closer contact and conflict producing a new historical identity that blended the economies and historical traditions of the Arab, Amazigh (or Berber), and Mande peoples. The growth of Timbuktu from a community of 10,000 persons in 1325 to a commercial/intellectual center of 30,000-50,000 people in 1591 was part of this process rooted in ecological change, but not simply and directly attributable to it.
Webb also describes a darker side of the emerging regional economy of the seventeenth century. The trade and political relations that emerged between peoples of the southward-moving desert's edge and peoples of the savanna had harsh consequences for many as a regional slave and horse trade expanded in the seventeenth century-a trade that, for a time, rivaled the trans-Atlantic trade from the West African coast. The means of production was military strength and mobility (in which the camel played a large part), which produced human booty. As Webb states: "Viewed over the long term, it appears that as the southern shore of the desert moved southward and waves of political violence broke onto the savanna, Black Africans were caught in the undertow."'2' Ecological change in this case expanded zones of conflict and the loss of human freedom.
Taken from the perspective of environmental history as a whole, therefore, the political history of the savanna assumes a new richness. The physical environment of the great empire states was not a fixed canvas, but a shape-shifting stage that demanded a continuing set of adaptations of economic base and political structure. Over the longer geological time frame Africa's climate has been more often dry than wet and more often warmer than cooler. Its seasonal transitions from wet to dry and the most dramatic anywhere. These long-term fluctuations have been significant during epochs of human history in which Africa social institutions and economic strategies evolved with the experience of human communities and individual farmers, hunters, and pastoralists. In his ambitious synthesis Africa: History of a Continent, John Iliffe offers the generalization that Africa's agricultural systems were historically mobile, a strategy to adapt to the environment and the climate rather than transforming them. Seasonal movement of people, domestic livestock, and animals was such an adaptation. As Iliffe suggests, most livestock economies in Africa chose to follow the movement of moisture and pasture rather than stockpiling their animals' food supply. Choices to migrate by herders of camels, cattle, sheep, or goats were finely tuned judgments about those species' needs for food and moisture, as well as their capacity to work and serve as a form of wealth.
Yet, as always, there has been an infinite set of variations and exceptions. In northem Ethiopia farmers did'not move with the seasons but rotated the planting of cereals, pulses (peas and beans), and fallowing in a fashion finely tuned to the arrival and departure of summer rains followed by a long dry season. In Eastern Sudan, camel-herding Hadendowa planted sorghum in moist riverain soils and then retreated with their animals to distant wet season pastures until the harvest was ready eight months later. Farners in northeast Zambia practiced citemene, a system of shifting seasonal agriculture that required large tracts of land but maximized scarce soil nutrients.31 In East Africa the Maasai historically followed pasture with their herds of cattle and goats, carefully avoiding full contact with thickets of acacia scrub infested with tsetse flies bearing deadly sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis).
In The great problem with seasonality is that the onset of seasons and levels of rainfall vary, while the Chambers model operates on the basis of an average year. In the actual rainfall regime faced by farmers, the question has been whether rains that began last year on June 12th will do so again this year and whether the level will be sufficient to begin the full cycle of events necessary to plant and harvest a crop. The uncertainty of levels from one year to the next underlies farm-level decisions historically. Farmers may well know the general features of seasonality within their farming system but they cannot predict the more subtle annual variations of the seasons' onset and duration and thus must build risk aversion strategies around these uncertainties. In most areas of Africa historically prone to drought, year-to-year variability is a strong feature: climatic data show rather conclusively that the lower the annual total, the greater the degree of variability.35 Thus the seasonality models must incorporate the idea that economic and social institutions interpret the effects of climate and, over time, become part of social adaptation. Annual rainfall totals in Africa may change drastically over time and cannot be reliably proven to be cyclical or to formn patterns historically reconstructable from contemporary data, whereas variability is a function of more immutable geophysical features such as topography and elevation.38 The study of seasons and variability does not rely on absolute figures but on the more reliable indicator of patterns verifiable from recent empirical data and the principle that variability itself was a part of local climate and therefore a factor in development of human seasonal strategies over time. These strategies include interaction with the basic features of farming/social systems: crops and crop mix, technology, the timing of labor demands, livestock/crop integration, and soil characteristics.
Though there is good evidence from the perspective of the longue duree that some aspects of the seasons can change over time or within distinct epochs of high or low rainfall, the principles of variation appear to be fairly consistent. If we do not have reliable rainfall data for formative periods of highland Ethiopian history, for example, we can at least provide analysis based on patterns of variation and not rely solely on anecdotal and subjective evidence of crises such as droughts. This approach has important implications for areas where historical climate data are weak, since historical patterns of variability within the between seasons can be established with more recent and reliable time series data. In Africa, where annual rainfall time series data prior to World War II are unavailable, historians have here- 36 The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the mean; the lower the coefficient the higher the reliability of rainfall. This calculation is now commonly used by climatologists as the standard measure of climate variation. Meteorology uses often ten-day periods rather than seven-day weeks. As the field of African environmental history has grown in depth and scope in recent years, how has its treatment of climate as a "limiting factor" or as a part of historical conjuncture changed or infused itself into the analysis of historical ecology? In truth, the new generation of environmental history takes the explicit study of climate in no more serious a fashion than did the earlier generation. One notable exception is the masterful work of James Giblin that examines seriously the linkage between precolonial political authority and control over rainfall as one dimension of 43 Watts, "Sociology of Seasonal Food Shortages," 201. 
